by Rym Momtaz*
Nathalie Tocci
Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali
The idea that freezing Ukraine’s NATO membership would advance peace is premised on the assumption, which has been proven empirically wrong, that NATO membership, or the prospect thereof, was the cause of war.
As is well known, Ukraine was not on the cusp of entering NATO in 2022, nor is it today. Yet this didn’t stop Russia from invading the country. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that had Ukraine been a NATO member, this war would not have come about.
Likewise, ruling out NATO membership—and presumably also Article 5-like bilateral security guarantees—from a future deal today, rather than cementing a peace, would eviscerate its meaning, setting the stage for a new round of war.
After Russia’s invasion, it is clear that peace in Ukraine—and in Europe more broadly—can only rest on strong security guarantees, whether provided through membership in a formal defense alliance, or, given the United States’ (among others’) reluctance to proceed on this front, bilaterally, both through legally binding commitments and direct involvement in securing a possible truce in Ukraine and bolstering its defenses. Excluding provisions of the like from any deal would only serve to prepare the next round of fighting.
Daniel Fiott
Head of the Defence and Statecraft Programme at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance
Let me answer the question with another question: Are Europeans willing to support Ukraine without American support? The answer appears to be a “nein!” from Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has ploughed ahead with anticipatory “peace talks” with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Berlin is vibing with the perceived mood music in Washington and has decided to move early, despite the talks largely being read as a cynical move for domestic political posturing in Germany.
Opening negotiations with Putin by showing the West’s hand on freezing NATO membership and the frontline too early sounds like the move of a novice, handing Russia a veto over membership in the alliance, hardly the stuff of the “art of the deal.”
We should also question the motives of those in Europe calling for a “peace deal” at any price. So Europe can start to import Russian oil and gas again? So that Europeans can soften the defense spending burden in light of budgetary pressures? If this is what European leaders think a “peace deal” with Putin will result in, then the situation is worse than it appears. We cannot entertain the idea of peace at all costs, simply because relaxing defense spending and importing Russia fossil fuels is completely anathema to Europe’s interests—and those of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, too.
Kristi Raik
Deputy director of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn
No, freezing Ukraine’s NATO accession would not bring us closer to a sustainable peace. On the contrary, it would encourage Russia to continue its efforts to subsume Ukraine under its sphere of influence. NATO would repeat the mistake it made at the Bucharest Summit of 2008 when Ukraine—and Georgia—were granted the prospect of membership but no path to get there.
The idea of freezing Ukraine’s NATO process is based on the wrong presumption that Russia invaded Ukraine because of NATO enlargement. Moscow would not be content with Ukraine’s neutrality and gaining some territory. It would want more.
Freezing the contact line and getting Ukraine into NATO swiftly would be a more promising path to peace. Russia would be faced with a new strategic reality of a stronger NATO.
If Trump does not want to become a loser in Putin’s eyes, he has to come up with a solution that provides credible security guarantees for Ukraine. NATO is not the only possible solution, although it would be the most effective one. Europeans must step up their contributions. Europe is not out of money, and the world is not out of stock. The price of building a sustainable peace is smaller than the price of a prolonged war.
Stefan Meister
Head of the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Putin’s demand for demilitarization, “denazification,” and neutrality of Ukraine aims to destroy Ukraine as an independent, democratic, and functioning state. Only reliable security guarantees for Ukraine can prevent this scenario, either as a member of NATO or in bilateral cooperation with key NATO members who arm Ukraine in a way that makes it too costly for Moscow to attack the country.
There is currently no plausible scenario which leads to a return of the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. At the same time, Crimea is about the security of Ukraine and the military balance in the Black Sea. That means returning Crimea to Ukraine is also crucial to the future of European security.
For Ukraine, long-term U.S. and European support is crucial. There is no alternative. If Donald Trump wants to make a “good deal” with Vladimir Putin, he must understand that only a strong Ukraine with functioning security guarantees will bring peace. Olaf Scholz will no longer play a role in this; all his current actions are about the upcoming German election. For Putin, it is all about the U.S. president, until the Europeans prove him wrong and show that they are sovereign in terms of their own security.
Nigel Gould-Davies
Senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
It would be an error to construct the problem of achieving a ceasefire as one of pressing Ukraine, the injured party, to compromise. A ceasefire will require both aggressor and victim to stop fighting.
But there is no evidence that Putin has abandoned his initial primary goal of his invasion—the subordination of Ukraine—or his secondary one of reordering European security on terms that leave Europe vulnerable to Russian power. His psychological and historical obsession with Ukraine is so deep that he is only likely to accept a genuine compromise if he believes that continuing to fight jeopardizes the security of his own regime. Despite growing economic and manpower strains, Russia is far from crisis, and is drawing on resources and troops provided by its partners.
There is little sign that Ukraine’s leadership or society is ready to abandon its territory or, more fundamentally, its search for Western security guarantees. In the worst case, a large-scale Russian breakthrough might conceivably force such a decision on Kyiv. But as Putin himself has said, if Ukraine is losing, why would Russia stop fighting? At most, he might agree a ceasefire that leaves Russia dominant and allows it to reconstitute its forces. This would very likely be a breathing space before a third invasion of Ukraine.
Arkady Moshes
Director of the Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia research program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Western capitals, with Berlin in the lead, did everything to make sure Ukraine’s accession into NATO would remain a figure of speech and not become a matter of practice. That has not prevented Russian aggression.
Freezing Ukraine’s NATO membership process will not lead to a sustainable peace. On the contrary, unless the West protects Ukraine’s borders it is likely to encourage Russia to annex Belarus, bring Moldova back into Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence by military or other means, and further threaten Ukraine in a new round of hostilities.
Moscow is against any institutional integration of Ukraine into the West and is ready to use military means to prevent it. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas were indirectly triggered by a relatively minor development in Ukraine-EU relations.
What the Kremlin will try to obtain through negotiations is Western legitimization of its territorial expansionism and a veto on key European security issues, as well as recovering its frozen assets and lifting the sanctions. This would free Moscow from compensating for the damage it caused and the reconstruction of Ukraine. And sensing the weakness of its opponents, Russia will increase its pressure to obtain what it wants. Vladimir Putin seems confident that time is on his side.
John Lough
Associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House
Ukraine is close to the limits of its resilience in terms of human, economic, and social capital. If the United States is no longer prepared to provide the essential military and financial support for it to continue fighting, Kyiv will have no option but to seek a pause. This will require accepting temporary territorial losses and freezing NATO membership.
By doing so, Ukraine can win valuable time and start rebuilding its economy and army. Of course, the devil will be in the detail. Will Ukraine be able to restore its full export capacity via the Black Sea? How long will the freeze on NATO membership last?
The real question is how to guarantee Ukraine’s security in the meantime. If Trump believes this is a task for the Europeans, France and the UK as nuclear powers will need to step up and take the lead. Yet for this deterrence to be credible, both will need to be sure that they are still under a U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Then there is the question of deploying peacekeepers to police the demarcation line. Will Russia agree to this? And what restrictions will it want to put on the size of the Ukrainian army?
Martin Quencez
Director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
The negotiations of a ceasefire with Russia will require difficult trade-offs. NATO membership, while providing a straightforward answer to the question of the security of Ukraine, is not the only way allies can help Ukraine defend itself after a potential ceasefire. This should therefore not be seen as a red line in principle but rather a possible bargaining chip to achieve the best results for European security.
The question of timing will however be crucial. Announcing a freezing of Ukraine’s NATO membership process even before entering into serious negotiations with Russia is just counterproductive. Allies should stop making declarations about what they will not do, as it simply weakens any diplomatic leverage.
At the same time, European allies must take U.S. President-elect Trump’s commitment to engage in negotiations as soon as he arrives at the White House seriously. This means that allies must already design the alternative options to NATO in order to provide credible security guarantees to Ukraine. For several European countries, NATO membership to Ukraine was an attractive solution because it was less costly—both financially and militarily—than the provision of ad hoc security guarantees. While this may still be Ukraine’s long-term strategic horizon, developing an alternative and credible capability and budgetary plan constitutes the priority in the post Trump-election environment.
Leo Litra
Visiting fellow in the Wider Europe program at the European Council on Foreign Relations
Freezing Ukraine’s NATO membership may well contribute to the end of the war but it will also most certainly encourage renewed Russian aggression. Through the Minsk agreements signed in 2014–15, Ukraine conducted almost 200 rounds of negotiations and twenty ceasefires, which ended with new escalations and a large-scale invasion. It is hard to believe that the West will fail to learn from its past experience and make Ukraine vulnerable again.
Currently, it seems that in Kyiv there are two preconditions for negotiations: territorial integrity and security guarantees. The territorial integrity of Ukraine should not be questioned despite admitting that the full restoration of control over the occupied regions might take years.
Obtaining security guarantees that can prevent a new war unfolding in the future are a core Ukrainian demand ahead negotiations. The most viable option would be NATO membership. But given U.S. and German reticence, transition models could be considered. These could be “boots on the ground” from a coalition of resolute European states that would be encouraged by the United States. This would deter Russia from launching a new war and would also serve the incoming Trump administration’s narrative about a Europe with less U.S. reliance and in charge of its own continent. It is high time for Europe to unite and pursue this policy.
Agnieszka Legucka
Senior research fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Agreeing to freeze Ukraine’s NATO membership would imply the alliance accepting Russian influence over its policies. NATO’s open-door policy is fundamental, and if Putin feels he can dictate terms, he may soon challenge NATO’s presence on its eastern flank. This could lead to demands similar to those from December 2021, when Russia insisted on NATO withdrawing military infrastructure from Central Europe, aiming to revert to pre-1997 conditions.
Russia’s goals extend beyond Ukraine. The Putin regime thrives on confrontation with the West, presenting Russians with the illusion of imminent victory. Putin isn’t even focused on a neutral Ukraine; back in early 2014, Ukraine was neutral, led by a pro-Russian president, with 70 percent of Ukrainians against NATO membership. Nevertheless, Russia violated its neutrality, annexed Crimea, and began a covert invasion of Donbas. Russia seeks a restructured international order that weakens NATO and diminishes U.S. dominance.
What are Ukraine’s options? It could face prolonged “Soviet-style” negotiations, where demands are inflated, and concessions endlessly demanded. This won’t be the quick deal Donald Trump might be hoping for; he may instead opt to arm Ukraine, potentially accelerating victory.
Yuliya Bidenko
Visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe
Western allies have made it clear that NATO membership is not a realistic perspective. There have been no high-level strategic discussions on the terms or preconditions for Ukrainian accession. In some European capitals, the discussions have gone from either security guaranties or attempts to regain territories to neither of those.
Believing that freezing the conflict and rejecting Ukraine’s NATO membership will bring lasting peace with Russia is wishful thinking, especially in Germany. Ukrainian neutrality and Western appeasement of Moscow did not prevent the annexation of Crimea and attack on the Donbas in 2014, nor the 2022 full-scale invasion. Instead, it was Russian aggression that increased support for NATO and EU membership in Ukraine.
The inability to recover the territories occupied by Russia is the most sensitive and problematic issue for Ukrainian society and will be a challenge for the international order. Testimonies of those who survived Russian occupation and war crimes since 2022, continued ethnic replacement, and the militarization of education in the occupied regions suggest that sacrificing these territories and people will be accepted as a just peace. Therefore, more than half of the Ukrainians support trying to regain full territorial integrity.
*first published in: Carnegieendowment.org
By: N. Peter Kramer
