by Gwendolyn Sasse*
Germany’s regional elections in Thuringia and Saxony on September 1 spelled out the weakness of the country’s mainstream democratic parties. But they also revealed how effectively Russia’s war against Ukraine can be instrumentalized.
The war is not the cause of the weakness at the heart of many Western democracies, but Germany has become the most extreme case. Thirty years after the country’s reunification, the political distance between east and west remains large. It functions as a lab for the instrumentalization of foreign and security policy. Elements of these dynamics exist in many Western democracies.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has now become part of local politics in European countries. It was the dominant overarching topic in Germany’s elections in Thuringia and Saxony in East Germany. The election results of 1 September mark a caesura in German politics. The right-wing extremist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has opposed support for Ukraine, became the strongest force in Thuringia with about a third of the regional vote, leaving other parties trailing behind. In Saxony, the AfD also secured a third of the vote but came a close second to the Christian Democrats (CDU). By comparison, the parties in the German national government—the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the Liberals (FDP)—jointly achieved around 10 percent of the vote in each region, further weakening an already stumbling coalition a year ahead of national elections and at a critical moment in the war. Coalition-building or minority governments in Thuringia and Saxony are bound to be fraught, as formal or informal agreements will need to be forged with at least the representatives of the far left, and the AfD will have a significant say over day-to-day matters. Thus, the topic of the war is here to stay.
Sahra Wagenknecht, long-time member of the parties emerging from the former socialist party of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), set up a new party built around her personality—the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). She saw an opportunity to merge an abstract idea of peace with an equally abstract Russia-friendly sentiment in East Germany. The latter is rooted in a contradictory and diffuse idea rather than a real memory of the Soviet control regime in the GDR or actual personal contacts in or knowledge about Russia. Historical legacies, in particular strong anti-Americanism and a revisionist narrative presenting the GDR as a “peaceful state” (Friedensstaat)—despite its high degree of militarization—were activated amid a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with democratic party politics and a longing for stability. Calling for peace and, by extension, a diplomatic end to the war underpins a resistance to higher defense spending. The German context provides a fruitful setting for these tactics, but they are not unique to Germany and have been increasingly effective in different corners of Europe and in the United States.
Societal dissatisfaction and a sense of not being represented by existing parties, amplified by the emotional appeal of the idea of peace as a signifier of stability, are becoming risks for collective Western support for Ukraine. Ironically, a war that pits authoritarian Russia against Ukraine’s choice to be a democracy integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, many Western democracies find themselves under domestic pressure. The biggest unknown in this respect are the U.S. presidential elections in November, but as the German case shows, local politics have become foreign policy. Uncertain economic prospects also play into the hands of those vaguely calling for peace without ever suggesting a concrete and realistic path toward it.
For Ukraine, this collision with the domestic preoccupations of some of its key allies comes at a critical time. It is still too early to judge the long-term implications of the Ukrainian military advance into the Russian Kursk region. Discussions about the advance leaving defense lines in the Donbas region weakened are gaining momentum in Ukraine’s military and political establishment, as is the difficult issue of mobilization, which has become an increasingly divisive issues in Ukrainian politics. A government reshuffle is underway. Key officials, including Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olha Stefanishyna tendered their resignation on September 4 but may return to politics in new positions. It is unclear whether this is part of an orchestrated reshuffle of positions or a sign of growing political disagreements at a critical moment in this war.
What is certain is that the combination of increasingly scarce military capabilities to spare and rising domestic pressure to resolve the conflict in some of Ukraine’s major Western backers do not bode well for Ukraine.
*Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe, the director of the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Berlin
**first published in: Carnegieendowment.org
By: N. Peter Kramer
