Should NATO Coordinate Military Support for Ukraine?

by Judy Dempsey*

STEFANIE BABST/ STRATEGIC ADVISOR AND FORMER NATO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL

The NATO allies’ recent announcement, triggered by the outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, about a new package for Ukraine is nothing but a poor window-dressing exercise. It aims at disguising the bitter truth that member countries do not have the guts to invite Ukraine for accession talks at their summit meeting in July.

Bringing Ukraine just one inch closer to NATO’s door remains a political no-go for Washington, Berlin, plus a few other allies; hence Stoltenberg’s proposed “summit deliverable” should at least pretend that the allies’ support for Ukraine is ironclad. But it is not. Suggesting a partial transfer of the Ramstein group’s coordination function to NATO, seconded by a fuzzy midterm financial commitment, is not a strategic game changer.

Thus far, Washington has been reluctant to give away the important political tool of coordinating military assistance and training needs for Ukraine. But since the Biden/Blinken team is unwilling to confront Moscow robustly, Washington has, albeit reluctantly, greenlighted Stoltenberg’s proposal as an acceptable compromise.

Still, the Western alliance ducks away from addressing the real strategic issue: without actively rolling back the terrorist regime in Moscow, Ukraine faces a high risk of being crushed by Russia at its doorstep. Apparently, some allies could live with such a scenario.

HEINRICH BRAUSS/ FORMER NATO ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING

Ukraine is NATO’s Distinctive Partner that aspires to NATO membership. The 2023 Vilnius summit confirmed that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”. It is fighting for its survival as an independent, democratic nation against Putin’s brutal war of aggression. At the same time, Ukraine’s fight benefits the security of the alliance. It therefore seems only logical that NATO should coordinate the military support for a partner under such a distress.

But what would this mean in practice? It seems conceivable that a high-ranking NATO official, such as the deputy secretary general, supported by a civil-military task force, would be appointed chief coordinator. NATO’s defense planners who know the inventories of all thirty-two allies could advise which allies could provide which capabilities and take on a fair share of the burden.

But any NATO representative would need the full backing of the entire North Atlantic Council to persuade allies to provide the support they should. Assuming that the United States would continue to support Ukraine after the presidential election, the U.S. secretary of defense, acting with the authority of NATO’s leading nation on whose assistance all other allies ultimately depend, has more leverage.

Moreover, the coordinating role should further motivate the United States itself to continue to provide significant support. This would also send an important message to Russia.

DOMINIK P. JANKOWSKI/ DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND TO NATO

Yes, NATO should do more for Ukraine for three reasons. First, NATO is a powerhouse when it comes to defense planning, sustainment, coordination of military training, and setting capability targets. In fact, NATO has the right tools and expertise to coordinate to a greater extent military support for Ukraine.

Second, by gradually taking over the tasks from the U.S.-led initiatives—starting with the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine—the European allies will have a chance to clearly demonstrate their readiness to contribute to the burden-sharing efforts when it comes to military support for Ukraine. This is especially vital for maintaining transatlantic unity in the longer term.

Third, there is a clear demand signal from Ukraine. Kyiv expects NATO to step up its visibility and role in the long-term military support and planning. At the same time, these additional NATO efforts should complement the already ongoing work, including the NATO-Ukraine interoperability roadmap as well as the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) that Poland agreed to host.

LINAS KOJALA/ DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE, VILNIUS

The primary objective is the swift and consistent delivery of support to Ukraine. If this can be achieved through the existing Ramstein format, then it should be continued; however, recent challenges with U.S. support packages being delayed in Congress hint at possible future hurdles.

The proposal for NATO to assume leadership seems to be in its preliminary stages and not fully developed. Additionally, the Ramstein format includes about fifty countries, almost half of which are not part of NATO. Thus, if NATO were to take the lead, ensuring the participation of these nations would be essential.

Nevertheless, the prospect of more equitable burden sharing under NATO’s leadership is attractive, especially with the U.S. presidential election looming. Moreover, making the support process more technocratic would be advantageous. After setting a strategic direction, support packages should not be subject to high-level political debates at every turn, as these can be swayed by political cycles and other issues.

In any event, the indispensable role of the United States in supporting Ukraine and upholding NATO’s cohesion remains clear. Therefore, any future steps hinge on the ability to forge a strong consensus among allies and the determination to implement it all in practice.

ALENA KUDZKO/ VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMMING AT GLOBSEC

Yes. The institutionalization of the coordination of military support for Ukraine within NATO will help ensure greater stability and predictability of assistance. If designed effectively, cooperation can improve planning efficiency for both Ukrainians and allies through assessments of what is needed, when, and how to deliver on these needs, including over the long term.

It will also mitigate any damage incurred if particular governments decide to soften their support for Ukraine—not an unthinkable scenario in the United States and elsewhere.

Critics of such proposals are concerned that NATO could be perceived by Russia to be a party to the war. This argument, however, ignores the fact that Putin has already successfully persuaded Russians that their country is waging war against NATO in Ukraine. Western institutional intricacies and workarounds are of little interest or relevance to Putin and his supporters. What matters for them is whether Ukraine is strong enough to fight back or not.

Western institutional creativity, in other words, will not by itself be a cause for hostilities. Nor will collective support. The European Peace Facility, to this end, has not resulted in Russia launching a hot war against the EU.

The Kremlin indeed will have no problem finding a pretext for armed conflict with NATO if it wants to. But Moscow will actually be less inclined to do so if it sees NATO countries as organized under an institutional umbrella than if it perceives them as dysfunctional and afraid of their own bureaucratic shadow.

JOHN LOUGH/ ASSOCIATE FELLOW IN THE RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAMME AT CHATHAM HOUSE

In the absence of a better framework, the answer is yes. The EU is not currently qualified to play this role and NATO has the expertise even if its institutional capacity in this area has still to be tested.

The big question, however, is how effective NATO can function as a coordinating organization if the United States is a less committed ally. The onus will be on the European members of the alliance to step up and ensure that Ukraine has much improved capacity to defend itself. This will require building and maintaining a consensus—a process that is likely to prove challenging because of differing views among the European allies of what is at stake for Europe and how best to stop Russia achieving its war aims.

On the plus side, the urgency of the situation and the lack of alternatives will probably make consensus-building easier and force Germany in particular to take a braver position and recognize that the escalation of the war that it fears is more likely to happen if Ukraine does not receive the weapons it needs.

Europeans are finally waking up to the danger of a wider war if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine.

KRISTI RAIK/ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY, TALLINN

Yes, for two major reasons.

The main reason cited in media coverage is the need to prepare for a possible Trump presidency. Indeed, Europe and NATO are in the process of preempting the shock effects that may follow the U.S. presidential election. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has exposed the dependence of European security on the United States and American leadership of the Ramstein group in coordinating Western military assistance to Ukraine has been pivotal.

However, the war has also highlighted the need for Europeans to take more responsibility, which they have been gradually doing. The level of European support to Ukraine surpassed that of the United States last year, and it needs to grow further, hand in hand with the strengthening of European defense capabilities and industry.

Secondly, it is crucial for Ukraine’s—and Europe’s—long-term security that Ukraine is able take the next steps toward NATO membership. Strengthening the role of NATO in supporting Ukraine’s war effort would be a step in that direction. It would help improve interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces. Even more importantly, it would send a signal to Moscow that it cannot stop the process of Ukraine’s full integration to Western structures.

STEN RYNNING/ DIRECTOR OF THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK

Yes, NATO should coordinate military support for Ukraine. NATO has increasingly been sidelined in a war that will determine Europe’s security order. This has been an allied choice, motivated by a fear of a greater confrontation and escalation to nuclear war. Allied governments still make political decisions, but these have moved into various coalitions and not least into the G7.

Yet NATO remains the bedrock of continental security, and Ukraine will soon become a NATO member, allies say. The alliance has not in earnest addressed these wider issues, instead tending to its own defense and deterrence posture. This posture is vital, but the lesson from the 2010s is nonetheless clear: if NATO does not maintain a vibrant political dialogue, it is at risk, in French President Emmanuel Macron’s memorable words, of becoming “brain-dead.”

It is high time, therefore, that NATO as a whole gets involved in thinking about the long-term effects of the Ukraine war. Coordination of military support could be a welcome stepping stone.

STANLEY R. SLOAN/ AUTHOR MOST RECENTLY OF DE-TRUMPING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CAN BIDEN BRING AMERICA BACK?

Rather than acting out of fear for Trump, European allies should act out of thankfulness for President Biden’s pro-alliance, cooperation, commitment policies, and actions—and should say so loudly. Such an approach could help mitigate Trump claims that everything is getting better because of the threat he poses to the alliance.

That aside, the Biden administration should advocate NATO taking on the role of coordinating allied assistance to Ukraine. It would make the point that Ukraine should be as important to the European allies as to the United States and that the responsibility for supporting Ukraine is shared among all allies. Agreement on an exceptionally large support package for Ukraine covering military and non-military requirements would put an exclamation mark on the pledge and help deal with transatlantic burden-sharing concerns.

CARSTEN SONDERGAARD/ FORMER DANISH AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, IRELAND, NATO, GERMANY, AND TURKEY

I welcome proposals for a more active role for NATO. That also includes having NATO coordinate military contributions to Ukraine.

The specific reasons are clear. If implemented properly, it could create more transparency and predictability, perhaps even making it easier to find more shells!

The general reason is even more convincing. Since Bucharest in 2008, NATO summits have in various ways stated what should be the end goal for the relationship between NATO and Ukraine. But membership of Ukraine seems for many to be a long way off.

However, whether Trump gets elected or not, we need to move in that direction. Small pragmatic steps are necessary and probably the best way forward. It would make sense gradually to narrow the difference between full membership of NATO and the current situation. We need to make the ice thicker for future cooperation.

Lessons learned: if you have doubts about the idea, stop saying what we should not do it. Rather, reflect on how ideas like that can be used to soften the taboo about a NATO role.

Russia has broken the rulebook for European security, hence only a credible military deterrent can save Ukraine. And there is only one candidate for that role. Let’s prepare the ground.

PAUL TAYLOR/ SENIOR VISITING FELLOW AT THE EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is right to propose that the alliance coordinate military supplies for Ukraine instead of the current ad-hoc U.S.-led process, to try to ensure a continued flow of arms and ammunition whoever wins the U.S. presidential election.

The United States has matched equipment requirements and suppliers at regular meetings of willing nations, including NATO allies but also Japan, South Korea, and Australia, at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The reasoning for initially keeping NATO out of the picture was to rebuff the Kremlin’s narrative that NATO is waging war against Russia in Ukraine.

However, European allies rightly worry that if Republican Donald Trump wins in November, he could not only halt U.S. weapons and money but also throttle deliveries by other nations to pressure Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement.

Handing the coordination task to NATO, which has experience as a clearing house for procurement, makes sense if it can avert a hiatus and Trump-proof arms supplies. It doesn’t bring NATO closer to being a belligerent in Ukraine.

However, it’s an illusion to think creating a five-year $100 billion fund to arm Ukraine will lock in U.S. involvement. Congress can pull the plug at any time.

KURT VOLKER/ FORMER .S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO

Using NATO as a clearing house for aid to Ukraine should have been decided two years ago. It is the most organized, most efficient, most stable, and most well-practiced means of coordinating assistance among both NATO allies and partner countries.

Coupling that with a donor-driven fund, as Secretary General Stoltenberg has suggested, is even better. Unfortunately, the Biden administration has not wanted NATO to do this for two years for fear of creating the image of a NATO-Russia conflict. Doing so now is still the right thing to do and should be warmly welcomed.

Calling it Trump-proofing, however, is the worst possible messaging surrounding what is otherwise a good decision. No one has any idea what Trump’s NATO-Ukraine policy might be, or even if he will be elected president, so no one should make any assumptions. If there is one thing Trump has been consistent about, however, it is that NATO allies must pay their fair share. Creating a NATO clearing house and an associated fund is a way of ensuring allies do exactly that—pay their share.

So this would be doing something that, in Trump’s eyes, NATO should be doing anyway. No one would call it Biden-proofing... Would they?

ANNA WIESLANDER/ DIRECTOR FOR NORTHERN EUROPE AT THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Yes, it is a good idea. In fact, NATO is already a vehicle for non-lethal support to Ukraine, so the step is not that big to expand the role. And three years into the war, the escalation fear has proven wrong. Despite NATO allies sending increasingly advanced weapon systems to Ukraine, Russia has not escalated the war.

The idea to institutionalize allied support to Ukraine makes sense. It is a classic way to ensure sustainability and continuity in operations regardless of national governments. The mission in Afghanistan, first led by the United States and then by NATO, is just one example. Dedicated long-term support from the West also sends a crucial signal to Russia on Western resolve.

There are not giant investments needed by allies. An Estonian study indicates that a commitment of all Ramstein partners to military support of 0.25 percent of GDP annually would be enough.

Of course, the shift is a bit tricky for the Biden administration. Ahead of the election, President Biden does not want to appear weak by signaling lack of leadership, nor fear of losing the election. Therefore, the outlook should be broader than merely Trump-proofing military support.

Upcoming election results in Europe, for instance those of the European Parliament or of France, could also undermine it. And European allies must step forward and take their fair share of military support, then the United States can follow suit. If properly done, NATO could and should play a vital role to ensure that the West helps Ukraine win the war.

*a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe
** first published in: Carnegieeurope.eu