How neutral is neutral?

by Alexandra Brzozowski

It is hard to imagine that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will consider the potential start of Kyiv’s EU membership talks to be compatible with his idea of a ‘neutral’ Ukraine.

So far, there is little evidence that the delegations from Moscow and Kyiv, who are continuing their negotiations in Turkey this week, could find a compromise in the near future.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has acknowledged that his country might never actually join NATO and Ukrainian officials have indicated they’re open to discussing Ukraine’s status.

Let’s fast-forward for a minute to a point when the war is over. What exactly should a ‘neutral’ Ukraine look like, according to Putin?

Russia is now asking Ukraine to amend its constitution, committing it to military neutrality and renouncing future NATO membership, according to a new Russian draft ceasefire document reported by FT. In addition, Moscow wants Kyiv to give up its sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and the self-declared “people’s republics” in the Donbas.

EU membership would be still on the table, according to the draft document.

The Ukrainian side’s answer to the demands seems steadfast, with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba saying of the talks in Turkey: “We are not trading people, land or sovereignty.”

The peace talks are complicated by the fact they are being negotiated under the barrel of a gun. And of course, it is uncertain whether the positions on the negotiating table correspond with Russia’s real war aims.

But there’s one main problem with Ukraine’s potential neutrality, especially from Kyiv’s perspective: Russia will forever be a threat, and for Moscow, neutral might never be neutral enough.

Even if a semblance of neutrality is achieved, who is going to guarantee it stays that way? The stronger those security guarantees will be, the less probability there is for a breach of such a neutral status in the future.

But a neutral Ukraine following a European path would not be a first, it would have company in Europe among neutral or non-aligned member states.

Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta are all neutral or non-aligned countries within the EU. Outside the EU, Switzerland is a classic example.

They still have militaries but many of them decided they wouldn’t join military alliances, take sides in future wars, or allow foreign bases on their territory.

But the discussion about Ukraine’s ‘neutralisation’ comes at a time when external factors, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, have started to shift the positions of Europe’s non-aligned countries.

Public support for joining NATO has crept up in Sweden and Finland in the wake of Russia’s invasion. This doesn’t mean they aim to be invited to join the alliance tomorrow – but it has made their neutrality more flexible.

Next to already being ‘enhanced opportunities partners’ with NATO, meaning they train with alliance forces and increasingly use interoperable equipment, they have recently also received enhanced access to NATO intel for the duration of the Ukraine war.

Ireland, neutral in international relations since the 1930s, has seen a shift lately, too: Most Irish citizens want to boost military spending and nearly half want to join NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the latest polls.

Another “neutral” EU country, in the EU context, Denmark, has abstained from participation in EU military operations and from providing support or supplies to EU-led defence efforts thanks to its opt-out from European defence. But even this is now changing.

In the long run, the question will not be whether neutral is the answer, but rather how neutral neutral can really be.

*first published in: www.euractiv.com